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Abstract
We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have ad-
ditive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the
maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself,
if she were to partition the goods into n bundles, and then receive a minimum valued bundle.
Since maximin fair allocations (i.e., allocations in which each agent gets at least her maximin
share) do not always exist, prior work has focussed on approximation results that aim to find
allocations in which the value of the bundle allocated to each agent is (multiplicatively) as close
to her maximin share as possible. In particular, Procaccia and Wang (2014) along with Amana-
tidis et al. (2015) have shown that under additive valuations a 2/3-approximate maximin fair
allocation always exists and can be found in polynomial time. We complement these results by
developing a simple and efficient algorithm that achieves the same approximation guarantee.
Furthermore, we initiate the study of approximate maximin fair division under submodu-
lar valuations. Specifically, we show that when the valuations of the agents are nonnegative,
monotone, and submodular, then a 1/10-approximate maximin fair allocation is guaranteed
to exist. In fact, we show that such an allocation can be efficiently found by using a simple
round-robin algorithm. A technical contribution of the paper is to analyze the performance of
this combinatorial algorithm by employing the concept of multilinear extensions.
1 Introduction
This problem of allocating goods among agents in a “fair” manner has been extensively stud-
ied in the economics and mathematics literature for over fifty years; the first formal treatment
of fair division appears in the work of Steinhaus, Banach, and Knaster [Ste48]. Such problems
naturally arise in many real-world settings—e.g., in government auctions, border disputes, and
divorce settlements—and a vast literature has been developed to address fair division under var-
ious modeling assumptions. Multiple solution concepts, such as envy-freeness, proportionality, and
equitability, have been proposed to formally capture fairness; see [BT96] and [Mou04] for excellent
expositions.
Even though there is a significant body of work aimed at understanding the division of divisible
goods,1 questions related to the fair division of indivisible goods are relatively underexplored.
*Indian Institute of Science. barman@csa.iisc.ernet.in
†Chennai Mathematical Institute. sanathkumar9@cmi.ac.in
1The metaphor of divisible goods is useful in settings such as land division.
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In particular, it is known that fair allocations of divisible goods necessarily exist (with respect
to all the previously mentioned solution concepts), however, such guarantees do not hold for
indivisible goods; for example, if we have two agents and a single indivisible good, then, under
any allocation, the agent that does not get the good will envy the other. Furthermore, classical
fairness notions like envy-freeness and proportionality cannot even be approximately satisfied in
the case of indivisible goods.2
Motivated by these observations and the fact that many practical scenarios (such as course
allocation at educational institutions [Bud11] and division of inheritance consisting of, say, cars
and houses) inherently entail division of discrete goods, recent results have focussed on the prob-
lem of fair division of indivisible goods; see, e.g., [Bud11, BL16a, PW14, AMNS15] and references
therein. Specifically, this thread of research has considered notions of fairness3 which are appli-
cable to indivisible goods, and established existence and computational results for these solution
concepts.
One such fairness notion is the maximin share, which is defined in the notable work of Budish
[Bud11] (see also [Mou90]). Conceptually, maximin share can be interpreted through a discrete
(indivisible) generalization of the standard cut-and-choose protocol. In particular, this protocol is
used to fairly divide a cake (i.e., a divisible good) between two agents: the first agent cuts the cake
and then the second agent gets to select her favorite piece. Note that a risk-averse agent would
cut the cake into two pieces that have equal value for her. In other words, the first agent will cut
(partition) the cake to maximize the minimum value over the pieces in the cut (partition). The
protocol leads to a fair allocation in terms of envy-freeness, i.e., it results in an allocation wherein
each agent prefers her piece of the cake over the other agent’s piece.
Analogously, while dividing indivisible goods among n agents, we can (hypothetically) ask an
agent i to partition the goods into n bundles, and then the other agents get to pick a bundle before
i. This could possibly lead to agent i getting her least desired bundle in the partition. Hence, as in
the cut and choose protocol, a risk-averse agent would partition the goods so as to maximize the
value of the least desirable bundle (according to her) in the partition. The value that agent i can
guarantee for herself by partitioning in this manner is defined to be agent i’s maximin share. An
allocation is said to be maximin fair if, for every agent, the value of her bundle is at least as high
as her maximin share.
Overall, the maximin share provides an intuitive threshold, and using it, we can deem an
allocation to be fair if this threshold is met for every agent. Recent results in the computer
science literature have considered whether maximin fair allocations exist and can they be ef-
ficiently computed. It turns out that the existence of a maximin fair allocation is not guaran-
teed [PW14, KPW16]. But, this concept lends well to approximation guarantees: Procaccia and
Wang [PW14] have shown that when the agents have additive valuations, one can find an alloca-
tion wherein each agent gets a bundle of value greater than 2/3 times her maximin share, i.e., a
2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists. The proof of existence by Procaccia and
Wang is constructive, but it leads to a polynomial time algorithm only when the number of agents
2This is true, for example, when we have two agents and a single indivisible good.
3For example, EF1 [Bud11], EFX [CKM+16], and maximin shares [Bud11].
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is constant. Extending this result, Amanatidis et al. [AMNS15] have developed an algorithm that
finds a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation and runs in time polynomial in the number of
agents. It is relevant to note that the approximation guarantees obtained in these results and the
current paper are absolute, i.e., they guarantee that there always exists an allocation wherein each
agent receives a value at least a constant times her maximin share. The guarantees are not relative
to the “best-possible” allocation.
In the context of indivisible goods, the above mentioned results affirm the relevance of max-
imin shares as a measure of fairness, but they are confined to additive valuations. In this paper, we
extend this line of work and establish maximin fairness guarantees for both additive and submodu-
lar valuations. Given that submodular functions are extensively used in economics and computer
science to model preferences, our fairness guarantee for submodular valuations is a compelling
generalization of prior work.
Our Results and Techniques: Our first result (Theorem 1) considers fair division of indivisi-
ble goods between agents with additive valuations for the goods. In particular, we show that the
approximation guarantee obtained in [PW14] and [AMNS15] can be achieved by a simple,4 combi-
natorial algorithm.5 That is, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a 2/3-approximate
maximin fair allocation. To obtain this result we rely on a careful modification of an algorithm by
Lipton et al. [LMMS04], which, in particular, finds an allocation which is envy free up to one good
(EF1); formal definitions appear in Section 1.1. An arbitrary EF1 allocation might not provide
any non-trivial approximation guarantee in terms of the maximin share; see Appendix C.1 for an
example. Hence, in and of itself, the algorithm of [LMMS04] is not guaranteed to find an alloca-
tion that satisfies the desired maximin fairness guarantee. Nonetheless, we show that any given
additive instance can be reduced (using a result of [BL16a]) to one with a specific structure and,
then, an instantiation of the algorithm by Lipton et al. [LMMS04] (in a particular manner) finds an
allocation with the desired fairness guarantee. Our contribution lies in a careful application and
analysis of this algorithm.
In addition, we initiate the study of approximate maximin fair division under submodular
valuations. Specifically, we show that when the valuations of the agents are nonnegative, mono-
tone, and submodular, then a 1/10-approximate maximin fair allocation is guaranteed to exist
and, in fact, such an allocation can be efficiently found by using a simple round-robin algorithm
(Theorem 3).
A technical contribution of the paper is to analyze the performance of this simple algorithm
by employing the concept of multilinear extensions. This concept has been used in recent results for
constrained submodular maximization and, at a high level, it can be thought of as a continuous
surrogate (a continuous extension) for a submodular function; see Section 3.2 for a definition. It is
observed in [Von08] that the multilinear extension—of an agent’s valuation function—achieves a
4Simple in the sense that our algorithm just entails sorting values and finding cycles in directed graphs. In contrast,
the algorithm in [AMNS15] uses as a subroutine a PTAS (of Woeginger [Woe97]) which is based on solving integer
linear programs of constant dimension, using Lenstra’s algorithm [LJ83].
5In fact, we are able to compute a 2n
3n−1 approximate maximin fair allocation in polynomial time. This is slightly
better than the ( 2
3
− ) approximation guarantee of Amanatidis et al. [AMNS15].
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high value if the agent is allocated a bundle uniformly at random. We use this observation to show
that for each agent, in expectation, a bundle picked uniformly at random approximately satisfies
the maximin requirement. Intuitively, this fact asserts that a uniformly random allocation is fair, in
expectation. But, to obtain the desired approximation guarantee from this fact we cannot directly
apply standard techniques (such as pipeage rounding or randomized rounding), since we need
to satisfy the maximin requirement for multiple submodular functions simultaneously.6 Instead,
we show that in most rounds (of the round-robin algorithm), the gain in the value of an agent’s
bundle is comparable to the loss she incurs in the multilinear extension. We do so by defining the
notion of expected ordered marginals and using them to express the multilinear extension values; this
notion might be of independent interest. Overall, this shows that using the round-robin algorithm
we can efficiently find a 1/10-approximate maximin fair allocation.
We also show that a 4/3-approximate maximin fair allocation can be efficiently computed
when agents have additive valuations for chores (i.e., negatively valued goods). This improves
upon the previously best known 2-approximation of Aziz et al. [AGGW17]; see Appendix B.7
Related Work: As mentioned previously, fair division is a well-studied problem in multiple dis-
ciplines [BT96, Mou04, MBC+16]. In this paper we focus on allocating indivisible goods and, in
particular, study the concept of maximin shares. This concept was defined by [Bud11] as a natural
relaxation of fair-share guarantees [Mou14]. In particular, Budish [Bud11] applied this solution con-
cept to the problem of allocating courses to students, and showed that maximin shares for n agents
can be guaranteed if some goods are over allocated and the share of each agent is computed with
respect to n+ 1 agents, instead of n. Note that these allocation errors cannot be ignored when, say,
there is only copy of each good, and such a bi-criteria approximation guarantee does not provide
any nontrivial multiplicative approximation bounds.
The work of Bouveret and Lemaitre [BL16a] focuses on fair division of indivisible goods with
additive valuations. Along with other results, they show that if an allocation is fair with respect
to other solution concepts (such as envy freeness and proportionality), then it is maximin fair as
well. They also show that maximin fair allocations are guaranteed to exist for binary, additive
valuations. The empirical results presented in [BL16a] suggest that maximin shares invariably
exist when the additive valuations are drawn from particular distributions.
Procaccia and Wang [PW14] also study maximin shares under additive valuations. They prove
that maximin fair allocations do not always exist, but allocations wherein each agent gets a bundle
of value greater than 2/3 times her maximin share always exist. The proof of existence in [PW14]
is constructive, but it leads to a polynomial time algorithm only when the number of agents is
constant. Amanatidis et al. [AMNS15] extend this result by showing that a 2/3-approximate max-
imin fair allocation can be computed in polynomial time. Kurokawa et al. [KPW16] strengthen the
negative result of Procaccia and Wang [PW14]: they present smaller fair division instances which
6Note that, a direct application of randomized rounding leads to a logarithmic approximation guarantee. In partic-
ular, the concentration bounds for submodular functions [CV09] only establish the existence of a 1
O(logn)
-approximate
maximin fair allocation.
7In the case of chores the approximation factor is greater than or equal to one.
4
do not admit maximin fair allocations. In addition, they also show that when the valuations are
randomly drawn then maximin fair allocations exist with high probability.
Aziz et al. [AGGW17] consider maximin fair allocations for chores (i.e., negatively valued
goods). They show that, even in the case of chores, exact maximin fair allocations do not al-
ways exist and they complement this result by developing an efficient algorithm which finds a
2-approximate maximin fair allocation.
Maximin fair division is seemingly related to the well-studied Santa Claus problem [BD05,
BS06,Fei08,AKS14,AS10,CCK09], where the goal is to find an allocation that maximizes the mini-
mum value over all agents.8 But, note that the Santa Claus problem is an optimization problem—
the objective function is the egalitarian social welfare—whereas, in the maximin fair division prob-
lem the goal is to find an allocation that satisfies a property (that every agent gets her maximin
share). The two problems behave differently with respect to scaling. In particular, a maximin
fair allocation continues to be fair if a single agent scales her valuations, this is not the case with
the Santa Claus problem. These problems differ significantly in terms of approximability as well:
In the additive valuation case, the best known algorithm for the Santa Claus problem achieves a
O˜(nε)-approximation and runs in time O(n
1
ε ) [CCK09]; here n is the number of agents and ε > 0.
For the submodular valuation case, a O(n1/4m1/2)-approximation algorithm was developed for
the Santa Claus problem by Goemans et al. [GHIM09]; here m is the number of goods. On the
other hand, as we show in this paper, constant-factor approximation guarantees can be achieved
for the maximin fair division problem, even when the valuations are submodular.
In notable cases, fair division algorithms have been implemented: (i) Course Match [BCKO16]
is used for course allocation at Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, (ii) the web-
site Spliddit [GP14] provides free access to fair division methods, and (iii) the Adjusted Winner
Website9 implements an algorithm of Brams and Taylor [BT96] to fairly divide goods between
two players. These practical applications enforce the idea that simple/easily implementable fair
division algorithms—like the ones developed in this paper—have potential for impact.
1.1 Notation and Preliminaries
We let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of agents and [m] := {1, 2, . . . ,m} denote the set of
indivisible goods. The valuation of an agent i for a subset of goods S ⊆ [m] is denote by vi(S). For
ease of presentation, we will use vi(j)—instead of vi({j})—to denote the valuation of j ∈ [m].
Agents are said to have additive valuations when, for any subset of goods S ⊆ [m], the valuation
of agent i satisfies vi(S) :=
∑
j∈S vi(j). For ease of presentation, in the case of additive valuations,
we will also use vij to denote vi(j). Throughout, we will work with nonnegative valuations,
vij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m].
Agents are said to have nonnegative, monotone, submodular valuations (with v(∅) = 0) when
8The Santa Claus problem is also called the max-min fair allocation problem.
9http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner/
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for any A ⊆ B ⊂ [m] and g ∈ [m] \B, the valuation of agent i satisfies:
vi(∅) = 0
vi(A) ≤ vi(B) (Monotonicity)
vi(B ∪ {g})− vi(B) ≤ vi(A ∪ {g})− vi(A) (Submodularity)
Given a subset H ⊆ [m], we will consider marginal values with respect to H and, in particular,
define the marginal function fH as follows: fH(S) := f(H ∪ S)− f(H) for all S ⊆ [m]. Note that,
for any H ⊆ [m], if f is submodular then so is fH .
Write Πn(S) to denote the set of all n-partitions of set S ⊆ [m]. With a slight abuse of notation,
we will write Πn(m) to denote Πn([m]). Throughout, we will use the word allocation to denote an
n-partition (A1, . . . , An) where set Ai is allocated to agent i. In addition, an allocation of a strict
subset of the goods will be referred to as a partial allocation. We will use the term bundles to denote
subsets, Ais, in an (partial) allocation.
Our fairness guarantee is in terms of maximin shares. Formally,
Definition 1 (Maximin Share). For an agent i ∈ [n] and a subset of goods S ⊆ [m], the n-maximin share
is defined to be
µni (S) := max
(M1,M2,...,Mn)∈Πn(S)
min
k∈[n]
vi(Mk).
For ease of presentation, we will use µi to denote µni ([m]) and use maximin share for n-
maximin share, whenever n is clear from context. Ideally, we would like to ensure fairness by
partitioning the goods such that each agent gets her maximin share, i.e., partition the goods into
subsets (A1, A2, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(m) such that vi(Ai) ≥ µi for all i ∈ [n].
Since such partitions do not always exist (see Appendix C.2 for an example), a natural goal is
to study approximation guarantees. In particular, our objective is to develop efficient algorithms
that determine a partition (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(m) wherein each agent, i, gets a bundle, Ai, of value
(under vi) at least α times her maximin share, with α ∈ (0, 1] being as large as possible. We call
such partitions as α-approximate maximin fair allocations. When α = 1, we say that the allocation
is maximin fair.
In this work we develop simple and efficient algorithms that achieve this objective with α = 23
for additive valuations and α = 110 for submodular valuations.
Our analysis of the algorithm (for additive valuations) that achieves this result relies, in par-
ticular, on understanding the fairness of an allocation in terms of envy. Formally, for an alloca-
tion B = (B1, . . . , Bn), we say that agent i envies agent j iff i prefers j’s bundle to her own, i.e.,
vi(Bi) < vi(Bj). An allocation is defined to be envy free iff no agent envies any other. Since envy-
free allocations are not guaranteed to exist with indivisible goods,10 a natural relaxation (which
has been studied in literature; see, e.g., [Bud11]) is envy free up to one good (EF1): an allocation A is
said to be EF1 iff for each i, j ∈ [n] there exists a good g ∈ Aj such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \{g}). In fact,
10Consider a setting with two players, and one indivisible good that has a nonzero value for both the players.
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we will show that—for a relevant class of problem instances—our algorithm finds an allocation
with is envy free up to the least valued good (EFX) (defined in [CKM+16]).
Definition 2 (Envy free up to the least valued good (EFX)). An allocation A is said to be envy free up
to the least valued good (EFX) iff for every i, j ∈ [n] and each good g ∈ Aj we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
2 Additive Valuations
In this section we present an algorithm that efficiently finds a 23 -approximate maximin fair alloca-
tion under additive valuations.
Theorem 1 (Main Result for Additive Valuations). Given a set of n agents with additive valuations,
{vi}i∈[n], for a set of m indivisible goods, we can find a partition (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(m) in polynomial
time that satisfies
vi(Ai) ≥ 2n
3n− 1 µi for all i ∈ [n].
Here µi is the maximin share of agent i.
The proof of the theorem proceeds in two parts: (i) First, we show that the problem of finding
an approximate maximin fair allocation can be reduced to a restricted setting where the agents
value the goods in the same order. That is, them goods can be ordered (indexed), say g1, g2, . . . , gm,
such that the valuation of every agent i respects this ordering: for each a < b we have vi(ga) ≥
vi(gb). (ii) Then, we develop a 2/3-approximation algorithm for this restricted setting.
2.1 The Reduction of Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre
Intuitively, the greater the conflict of interest among agents, the harder it is to ensure a fairness
guarantee. For additive valuations, Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [BL16a] show that it is hardest to
guarantee the agents their maximin share when all agents have the same order of preference over
the goods. Formally, we say an instance is an ordered instance iff there exists a total ordering (≺)
over the set of goods [m] such that for all i ∈ [n] and j, j′ ∈ [m], such that j ≺ j′, we have vi,j ≥ vi,j′ .
Therefore, without loss of generality, we can say that an instance is ordered iff for all agents i ∈ [n]
and goods j, j′ ∈ [m], such that j < j′, we have vi,j ≥ vi,j′ . i.e. vi,1 ≥ vi,2 ≥ · · · ≥ vi,m.
Given a fair division instance I = ([n], [m], v) we will construct an ordered instance as follows.
First, note that for every agent i ∈ [n], there exists a permutation σi : [m] → [m] such that for
all j, j′ ∈ [m] with j < j′ we have vi,σi(j) ≥ vi,σi(j′). Using these permutations, we define a new
valuation function, v′, for every agent i by setting v′i,j = vi,σi(j) for all j ∈ [m]. That is, for agent
i, the value of the jth good in the new instance is equal to the jth largest valuation of i in the
original instance. We refer to I ′ = ([n], [m], v′) as the ordered instance of I . Note that we can find
the ordered instance of I in O(nm logm) time.
Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [BL16a] show that if there is an allocation A′ which guarantees every
agent her maximin share in I ′, then there is an allocation A that guarantees every agent her max-
imin share in I . Moreover, given a maximin fair allocation A′ (for I ′), a maximin fair allocation
7
A for the original instance I can be found in polynomial time. In fact, we directly use their proof
to show the following slightly stronger statement that such a reduction is possible with respect to
any set of scalars, αis, and not just with respect to the maximin shares.
Algorithm 1 Bouveret’s Algorithm ALG −B
Input : Instance I = ([n], [m], v) with an allocation A′ for the ordered instance I ′ = ([n], [m], v′)
such that v′i(A
′
i) ≥ αi for all i ∈ [n].
Output: An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) such that, vi(Ai) ≥ αi for all i ∈ [n].
1: For all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ A′i set pj := i. {This defines a sequence of agents, P := p1, p2, . . . , pm.}
2: Initialize allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) with Ai = ∅, for all i ∈ [n], and R← [m].
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: Pick k ∈ arg maxg∈R{vpj (g)}.
5: Update Apj ← Apj ∪ {k} and R← R \ {k}.
6: end for
7: Return A.
Theorem 2. Given a maximin fair division instance I = ([n], [m], v) and scalars {αi ∈ R}ni=1, let I ′ =
([n], [m], v′) be the ordered instance of I . If there exists an allocation A′ = (A′1, A′2, . . . , A′n) that satisfies
v′i(A
′
i) ≥ αi for all i ∈ [n], then there exists an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) in which vi(Ai) ≥ αi, for all
i ∈ [n]. Moreover, given I and A′, ALGBL computes the allocation A in polynomial time.
Proof. Clearly, ALGBL runs in polynomial time. Now, we will show that ALGBL computes the
required allocation A. Let kj denote the good allocated in the jth iteration of the second for-loop
(Steps 3 to 6) in ALGBL. Now consider agent i, suppose j ∈ A′i then kj ∈ Ai. Note that, for any
j 6= j′, we have kj 6= kj′ ; since, a good is removed from the set R after it is allocated. Before the
jth iteration of the second for-loop in ALGBL, exactly j − 1 goods had been allocated. Therefore
kj is among the top j goods for agent i. Hence, for all j ∈ A′i, vi(kj) ≥ v′i(j). This implies that,∑
j∈A′i vi(kj) ≥
∑
j∈A′i v
′
i(j), i.e., vi(Ai) ≥ v′i(A′i). Hence the condition that v′i(A′i) ≥ αi gives us
vi(Ai) ≥ αi for all i. This completes the proof.
Note that the maximin share depends on the values of the goods but not on the order, hence
the maximin share of an agent i in an instance I is equal to her maximin share in the ordered
instance I ′. Therefore, instantiating Theorem 2, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Given a maximin fair division instance I = ([n], [m], v) and α ∈ R write I ′ to denote the
ordered instance of I and µi (respectively µ′i) to denote the maximin share of agent i in I (respectively I
′).
If there exists an allocation A′ = (A′1, A′2, . . . , A′n) that satisfies v′i(A′i) ≥ αµ′i, for all i ∈ [n], then there
exists is an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) in which vi(Ai) ≥ αµi, for all i ∈ [n]. Moreover, given I and
A′, the allocation A can be computed in polynomial time.
2.2 Envy Graph Algorithm
As shown in Corollary 1, we only need address the setting in which the agents value the goods
in the same order. Hence, in the remainder of this section, we solely focus on ordered instances.
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That is, we will establish the desired approximation for instances wherein the goods are indexed,
say g1, g2, . . . , gm, such that for every agent i, we have vi(ga) ≥ vi(gb), for all indices a < b. The
approximation algorithm given in this section iteratively allocates the goods in decreasing order of
value (i.e., in increasing order of their index) and maintains a partial allocation, A = (A1, . . . , An),
of the goods assigned so far. In order to assign a good, the algorithm selects a bundle, Ai, by
considering a directed graph, G(A), that captures the envy between agents. The nodes in this
envy graph represent the agents and it contains a directed edge from i to j iff i envies j, i.e.,
vi(Ai) < vi(Aj).
The following lemma was established in [LMMS04] and it shows that we can always “resolve”
a partial allocation and obtain an acyclic envy graph. The proof of the lemma is direct, we provide
it here for completeness.
Lemma 1 ( [LMMS04]). Given a partial allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) of a subset of goods S ⊆ [m], we
can find another partial allocation B = (B1, . . . , Bn) of S in polynomial time such that
(i) The valuations of agents for their bundles do not decrease: vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ [n].
(ii) The envy graph G(B) is acyclic.
Proof. If the envy graph of A is acyclic then the claim holds trivially. Otherwise, write C = i1 →
i2 → . . . → i` → i1 to denote a cycle in G(A). Now, we can reallocate the bundles as follows: for
all agents k not in C, i.e., k /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , i`} set A′k = Ak, and for all the agents in the cycle set A′i
to be the bundle of their successor in C, i.e., set A′ia = Ai(a+1) for 1 ≤ a < ` along with A′i` = Ai1 .
Note that after this reallocation we have vi(A′i) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, the
number of edges in G(A) strictly decreases: the edges in C do not appear in the envy graph of
(A′1, . . . , A′n) and if an agent k starts envying an agent in the cycle, say agent ia, then k must have
been envious of ia+1 in A. Edges between agents k and k′ which are not in C remain unchanged,
and edges going out of an agent i in the cycle C can only get removed, since agent i’s valuation
for the bundle assigned to her increases. Therefore, we can repeatedly remove cycles and keep
reducing the number of edges in the envy graph to eventually a find a partial allocation B that
satisfies the stated claim.
Our algorithm uses Lemma 1 and is detailed below. Lemma 2 states that ALG returns an EFX
allocation and is proved below.
Lemma 2. For any ordered maximin fair division instance, the partial allocation found by ALG is envy
free up to the least valued good (EFX).
Proof. We will prove this by induction. Trivially, the partial allocation maintained by ALG after
allocating the good g1 is EFX. Let us assume that the partial allocation maintained by ALG, at the
end of the (j − 1)th iteration is EFX. We will now show that the partial allocation maintained by
ALG after allocating the good gj is EFX. A source node isn’t envied by any other agent. Also,
among the goods allocated so far, gj is the least valued good. Therefore, any new envy that is
created by assigning gj to a source of the envy-graph is envy by the least valued good (EFX).
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Algorithm 2 Envy Graph Algorithm ALG
Input : An ordered instance (i.e., an instance wherein the agents value the goods in the same
order) with n agents, m items, and valuations vij for each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m].
Output: An allocation that provides approximate maximin shares guarantee.
1: Order the goods, g1, . . . , gm, s.t. for every agent i ∈ [n] and a < b we have viga ≥ vigb .
2: Initialize allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) with Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ [n].
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: Pick a vertex i that has no incoming edges in G(A), i.e., i is a source vertex in G(A).
{The algorithm maintains the invariant that G(A) is acyclic. Hence, such a vertex is guar-
anteed to exist.}
5: Update Ai ← Ai ∪ {gj}.
6: if the current envy graph G(A) contains a cycle then
7: Use Lemma 1 to update A and, hence, obtain an acyclic envy graph.
8: end if
9: end for
10: Return A.
Therefore, the partial allocation by ALG after allocating the good gj is an EFX allocation. We now
obtaine an acyclic envy graph using Lemma 1. From Lemma 1, we know that valuations of agents
for their bundles do not decrease. So, in obtaining the acyclic envy graph we maintain the EFX
property. Therefore, by induction we know that the partial allocations maintained by ALG during
its execution are envy free up to the least valued good (EFX).
Next we introduce the concept of majorization and prove a technical proposition which will
be useful in establishing the desired approximation ratio. We say that a multiset X = {xi ∈ R |
1 ≤ i ≤ n}majorizes another multiset Y = {yi ∈ R | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} iff
k∑
i=1
x(i) ≥
k∑
i=1
y(i) ∀ 1 ≤ k < n, and
n∑
i=1
x(i) =
n∑
i=1
y(i).
Here x(i) (y(i)) is the ith largest element of X (Y ).11
A proof of Proposition 1 can be found in [Wu05]. For completeness, we provide one here as
well.
Proposition 1. Let v, v′ ∈ R be two elements of a multiset A of real numbers. In addition, say u, u′ ∈ R
satisfy u+ u′ = v + v′ and |u− u′| < |v − v′|. Then A majorizes (A \ {v, v′}) ∪ {u, u′}.
Proof. Define ft(S) to be the sum of the largest t elements in S. Consider the setA = {a1, a2, . . . , an}
such that a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an. Consider A′ = (A \ {v, v′}) ∪ {u, u′} such that u + u′ = v + v′ and
|u−u′| < |v−v′|. Without loss of generality, let v = ai1 ≥ v′ = ai2 and let u ≥ u′. Since u+u′ = v+v′
11Ties for the ith largest position are broken arbitrarily.
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and |u−u′| < |v−v′|, we have v ≥ u ≥ u′ ≥ v′. Therefore, the non-increasing sequence of elements
in A′ is
a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ ai1−1 ≥ ai1+1 ≥ · · · ≥ u ≥ ai3 ≥ · · · ≥ u′ ≥ ai4 ≥ · · · ≥ ai2−1 ≥ ai2+1 ≥ · · · ≥ an
We now do case-wise analysis:
1. For t < i1 and t ≥ i2: ft(A) = ft(A′).
2. For i1 ≤ t < i3 − 1: ft(A′) = ft(A)− ai1 + at+1 ≤ ft(A).
3. For i3 − 1 ≤ t < i4: ft(A′) = ft(A)− ai1 + u ≤ ft(A).
4. For i4 ≤ t < i2: ft(A′) = ft(A)− ai1 − at + u+ u′ = ft(A) + ai2 − at ≤ ft(A).
Therefore, ft(A′) ≤ ft(A) for any 1 ≤ t ≤ n. i.e. A majorizes (A \ {v, v′}) ∪ {u, u′}.
2.3 Proof of Theorem 1
To establish the stated claim, in the remainder of the proof we will show that v1(A1) ≥ 2n3n−1µ1; an
analogous argument establishes the desired bound, vi(Ai) ≥ 2n3n−1µi, for all agents i ∈ [n].
Write A = (A1, . . . , An) to denote the allocation returned by the algorithm ALG. Consider the
set of goods that have value more than 12v1(A1); specifically, define τ := arg min{j | v1(gj) ≤
1
2v1(A1)} and let H denote the set of high valued goods H := {g1, g2, . . . , gτ−1}. In addition, write
P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) to denote the partial allocation that ALG computes for H .12
Also, let t denote the smallest iteration count at which ALG assigns a good (in particular, good
gt) to a bundle of size two. Hence, every bundle in the partial allocation of the first t− 1 goods is
of size at most two.
Note that ALG keeps updating the partial allocations by adding goods to existing bundles.13
This observation implies that the cardinalities of the bundles in successive partial allocations keep
on increasing. This monotonic growth of the bundles also ensures that for each set Ai (in the final
allocationA), there exists a unique set Pj (in the partial allocation P) such that Pj ⊆ Ai. Moreover,
Lemma 1 guarantees that as ALG progresses the valuation of the agents also does not decrease; in
particular, v1(A1) ≥ v1(P1).
Let Q = (Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn) be the partial allocation considered by ALG at the beginning of the
tth iteration. The definition of t ensures that |Qi| ≤ 2 for all i ∈ [n]. Below we will show that τ ≤ t
and, therefore, using the observation that the cardinalities of the bundles are nondecreasing, we
get the following bound: |Pi| ≤ 2 for all i ∈ [n]. This, in turn, leads to the inequality τ ≤ 2n.
Recall that good gt was the first good that was assigned to a set of cardinality two. Write
Qb = {gx, gy} to denote this set. Since gt is included in Qb, b must have been a source of the acyclic
envy graph G(Q). In other words, agent 1 does not envy b’s current bundle, v1(Q1) ≥ v1(Qb) =
12Without loss of generality, we can assume that G(P) is acyclic, since an application of Lemma 1 in ALG simply
reassigns the bundles between agents and the constituent bundles in P do not change.
13Though, the bundle assigned to an agent might change during an application of Lemma 1.
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v1(gx) + v1(gy). Moreover, since ALG assigns goods in decreasing order of value, gt’s value is no
more than that of gx and gy: v1(gx) ≥ v1(gt) and v1(gy) ≥ v1(gt). Therefore, v1(Q1) ≥ 2v1(gt).
Since the valuation of agent 1 does not decrease during the execution of ALG, we get v1(A1) ≥
2v1(gt). By definition, gτ is the smallest indexed good that satisfies this inequality and, hence, the
inequality τ ≤ t holds.
We will first address the bundles that contain a good with index greater than τ−1. In particular,
we establish the following claim.
Claim 1. In the partial allocation retuned by the ALG, A = (A1, . . . , An), the following inequality holds
for all bundles the Ai that satisfy Ai ∩ {gτ , gτ+1, . . . , gm} 6= ∅
v1(A1) ≥ 2
3
v1(Ai) (1)
Proof. Consider a bundle Ai which contains a good ga with index a ≥ τ . Lemma 2 implies that
v1(A1) ≥ v1(Ai) − v1(ga). Also, note that v1(A1) ≥ 2v1(gτ ) ≥ 2v1(ga); here, the second inequality
follows from the fact that the values of the goods are ordered. Therefore, the claim holds.
We now need to argue about bundles in A that do not contain any good with index greater
than τ − 1. For each such bundle, Ai, we have a unique set Pj in the partial allocation P such that
Ai = Pj . This follows from the fact that after the (τ − 1)th iteration no good is allocated to any of
these bundles. Therefore, to get a handle on bundles inA that do not contain any good with index
greater than τ − 1 we will consider the partial allocation P . By definition, P is a partial allocation
of H = {g1, . . . , gτ−1}, i.e., ∪ni=1Pi = H . As mentioned above the cardinality of H (i.e., τ − 1) is at
most 2n. Write h := max{0, τ − 1− n}. We will consider the case in which τ ≥ n+ 1—and, hence
τ − 1 = n+ h—the other case wherein τ < n+ 1 is simpler and follows analogously.
Claim 2. The partial allocation P consists of (up to reordering) the following bundles:
{g1}, {g2}, . . . , {gn−h}, {gn−h+1, gn+h}, {gn−h+2, gn+h−1}, . . . , {gn−1, gn+2}, {gn, gn+1}. (2)
Proof. In the first n iterations ALG allocates the goods {g1, g2, . . . , gn} to n distinct bundles. At this
point of time—since the values of the goods are ordered—the agent with bundle {gn} envies all
the other agents.14 Hence, good gn+1 is allocated to the bundle {gn}. By definition, till the tth
iteration (with t ≥ τ − 1 = n + h) no bundle gets more than two items. Therefore, it must be
the case that all the remaining h goods in H are allocated to bundles of size one. Now, we can
argue inductively that when allocating good gn+k (for 1 < k ≤ h), ALGhas the following singleton
bundles: {g1}, {g2}, . . . , {gn−k}, {gn−k+1} and, among the agents that have these bundles, only
the agent with bundle {gn−k+1} can be a source in the envy graph.15 Therefore, good gn+k gets
assigned to bundle {gn−k+1}. Overall, we get that P consists of the bundles mentioned above.
14Without loss of generality, we can assume that the valuations are distinct.
15Recall that the values of the goods are ordered.
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g1 g2 g3 gn−1
gn+1
gn
gn+2
Figure 1: Sequence of allocation of the first τ goods.
In the remainder of the proof we say that a partial allocation R = (R1, . . . , Rn) majorizes
another partial allocation R′ = (R′1, . . . , R′n) iff {v1(Ri)}i majorizes {v1(R′i)}i. Specifically, we
have the following claim for P . The proof of Claim 3 is similar to the proof of Lemma 4 in [Wu05].
Claim 3. Every partial allocation of H (i.e., everyR ∈ Πn(H)) majorizes P .
Proof. We prove Claim 3 by a repeated application of Proposition 1. From Claim 2, we know
that every bundle in P is of size at most 2. In P , the goods {g1, g2, . . . , gn−h} are not paired up
with any other goods in H . And in P , the good gn−i is paired up with the good gn+1+i for all
0 ≤ i ≤ h − 1. For some t, let R ∈ Πn(H) be a partition that minimizes the sum of the value of
the largest t bundles in R (with respect to agent 1). We will show that R can transformed to P
without increasing the total weight of the largest t bundles:
1. For any empty bundle inR, we can move a good from any bundle containing more than one
good to this empty bundle. Note that, this step does not increase the weight of the sum of
the largest t bundles inR. i.e. We can modifyR so that no bundle inR is empty.
2. For any i ≤ n−h, such that gi is part of a bundle with more than 1 good inR. By pegionhole
principle, there exists a j > n − h such that {gj} is a singleton bundle in R. Then from
Proposition 1, by exchanging gi and gj , we will not increase the total weight of the largest t
bundles. i.e., We can modifyR so that, for all i ≤ n− h, {gi} is a singleton bundle.
3. For any bundle in R with atleast 3 goods (We use Ri to denote such a bundle). Let g =
min{Ri} be the smallest good in Ri. Then by pegionhole principle, there exists a j > n − h
such that {gj} is a singleton bundle in R.
(v1(Ri)− v1({g}))− (v1({g}) + v1({gj})) < v1(Ri)− v1({gj})
Since j > n − h, this implies that v1({gj}) ≤ v1({gn−h+1}). Using the EFX property fol-
lowed by the definition of H , we have v1({gn−h+1}) ≤ v1(A1) ≤ 2v1({gn+h}). Since Ri has
atleast 3 items, we know that 2v1({gn+h}) ≤ 2v1({g}) ≤ v1(Ri) − v1({g}). i.e., v1({gj}) ≤
v1({gn−h+1}) ≤ v1(A1) ≤ 2v1({gn+h}) ≤ 2v1({g}) ≤ v1(Ri)− v1({g}).
Hence, we have:
(v1(Ri)− v1({g}))− (v1({g}) + v1({gj})) ≥ −v1({g}) ≥ v1({gj})− v1(Ri)
Therefore, |(v1(Ri)− v1({g}))− (v1({g}) + v1({gj}))| < v1(Ri)− v1({gj}). Then from Propo-
sition 1, by moving g from Ri to the bundle {gj}, we will not increase the total weight of the
largest t bundles. i.e., We can adjustR so that every bundle has atmost 2 items.
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4. Therefore, now the only bundles that are in R but not in P are bundles having 2 items.
Suppose in R, there are 2 bundles {gi1 , gi2} and {gj1 , gj2}, such that i1 < j1 < i2 < j2. This
implies that, |v1({gi1 , gi2}) − v1({gj1 , gj2})| ≤ |v1({gi1 , gj2}) − v1({gj1 , gi2})|. Therefore from
Proposition 1, by exchanging gi2 and gj2 , we will not increase the total weight of the largest
t bundles. i.e., We can adjust R so that such pairs of bundles are not their in R. Now, R is
the same as P (up to a reordering).
Therefore we have showed that, for any t, P minimizes the sum of the largest t bundles.
We will now complete the proof of Theorem 1. Let ` be the number of bundles in {A2, A3, . . . , An}
that do not contain any good with index greater than τ − 1. As mentioned above, for every such
bundle, Ai there exists a unique bundle Pj in P such that Ai = Pj . Say, by reindexing, that
Pn−`+1, Pn−`+2, . . . , Pn are these ` bundles in A that do not satisfy the condition in Claim 1.
Write (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn) denote a partition of the [m] goods that achieves the maximin share for
player 1, i.e., minj∈[n] v1(Mj) = µ1 (see Definition 1). Consider the partial allocation (M1∩H,M2∩
H, . . . ,Mn ∩H) and index the sets Mis such that v1(M1 ∩H) ≤ v1(M2 ∩H) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(Mn ∩H).
Claim 3 implies that (M1 ∩H,M2 ∩H, . . . ,Mn ∩H) majorizes P . Hence,
∑n
i=n−`+1 v1(Mi ∩H) ≥∑n
i=n−`+1 v1(Pi). This inequality along with the fact that the valuations are monotone lead to the
following useful bound
n∑
i=n−`+1
v1(Mi) ≥
n∑
i=n−`+1
v1(Pi). (3)
Recall that Pn−`+1, Pn−`+2, . . . , Pn are bundles in A, and the remaining (n− `) bundles of A—
say, A1, A2, . . . , An−`—satisfy the inequality (1). Since v1 is additive, we have
∑n
i=1 v1(Mi) =∑n
i=1 v1(Ai). Therefore, inequality (3) provides the following bound
n−∑`
i=1
vi(Mi) ≤
n−∑`
i=1
v1(Ai) (4)
≤ v1(A1) + (n− `− 1)3
2
v1(A1) (via Claim 1) (5)
Overall, inequality (5) implies that v1(A1) is at least
2(n−`)
3(n−`)−1 times the average of the (n − `)
sets M`+1,M`+2, . . . ,Mn. Hence, v1(A1) ≥ 2n3n−1 minj∈[n] v1(Mj) = 2n3n−1µ1. This completes the
proof.
3 Submodular Valuations
In this section we show that when the agents have submodular valuations, then a 110 -approximate
maximin fair allocation is guaranteed to exist and, moreover, it can be found in polynomial time.
Our results only need oracle access to the submodular functions.
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3.1 Finding an Approximate Maximin Fair Allocation
We compute an approximate maximin fair allocation by employing Algorithm 3 (ROUNDROBIN)
as a subroutine. Algorithm 3 is quite direct: it takes as input thresholds, τis, for each agent i,
allocates high-valued (with respect to τi) goods as singleton bundles, and then partitions the re-
maining goods in a round-robin fashion. The technical contribution here it to show that, for each
agent i, as long as τi is no more than the maximin share µi, the bundle Pi allocated to i by Algo-
rithm 3 satisfies vi(Pi) ≥ 110τi. It is relevant to note that this guarantee holds independently for
each agent i (as long as τi ≤ µi) and will not be violated even if τj > µj for j 6= i. Formally, we
establish this guarantee in Lemma 3 and use use its contrapositive version (i.e., if Algorithm 3
returns a Pi such that vi(Pi) < 110τi, then it must be the case that τi > µi) to establish the main
result of this section (Theorem 3).
In particular, ALGSUB starts by setting thresholds τis, which are guaranteed to be more than
the maximin shares. Then, it (geometrically) decreases the threshold for agent i, if the partition
returned by ROUNDROBIN does not satisfy vi(Pi) ≥ 110τi. In such a case, as stated previously, τi
must have been greater than µi and, hence, decreasing the threshold is justified. Overall, in Sec-
tion 3.4 we show that ALGSUB efficiently finds thresholds, for each agent, which are comparable
to their maximin share, and establish the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Main Result for Submodular Valuations). Given a maximin fair division instance with m
goods and n agents that have nonnegative, monotone, submodular valuations vi : 2[m] → R+ for all i ∈ [n].
ALGSUB, in polynomial time, finds an allocation P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) which satisfies vi(Pi) ≥ 110µi, for
all i ∈ [n]. Here µi is the maximin share of agent i.
We begin by stating ROUNDROBIN and establishing its key property, Lemma 3.16
Lemma 3. Given a maximin fair division instance with m goods and n agents, whose valuations, vi :
2[m] → R+, are nonnegative, monotone and submodular. Let P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) be the allocation
returned by ROUNDROBIN for this instance, with thresholds τi ∈ R+ for i ∈ [n]. Then, for each agent i
whose input threshold satisfies τi ≤ µi, we have
vi(Pi) ≥ 1
10
τi.
Here, µi is the n-maximin share of agent i.
Remark 1. In Appendix A, we provide a polynomial-time 1/9-approximation algorithm for computing the
maximin share of an agent whose valuation function is nonnegative, monotone, and submodular. Hence,
we can find also find an approximate maximin fair division by a single application of ROUNDROBIN (by
setting the thresholds τis to be 1/9 approximations of the actual maximin shares µis). The approximation
guarantee obtained by this method, though constant, is worse than ALGSUB, which invokes ROUNDROBIN
polynomially many times.
16Note that this lemma does not rule out the possibility that ROUNDROBIN finds a bundle Pi which satisfies vi(Pi) ≥
1
10
τi, even if τi > µi.
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Algorithm 3 ROUNDROBIN: Computation of allocations with respect to thresholds
Input: An instance overm goods and n agents, whose valuations, vi : 2[m] → R+, are nonnegative,
monotone and submodular, along with thresholds τis for each i ∈ [n].
Output: An allocation P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) such that vi(Pi) ≥ 110τi, for each agent i ∈
[n] whose threshold satisfies τi ≤ µi. Here µi is the n-maximin share of agent i.
1: Initialize set of agents A = [n] and set of goods G = [m].
2: while there exist agent i ∈ A and good j ∈ G such that vi(j) ≥ 110τi do
3: Allocate Pi ← {j}, and update A← A \ {i} and G← G \ {j}.
4: end while
5: Assume, via reindexing, that the set of remaining agents A = {1, 2, . . . , |A|}.
6: while G 6= ∅ do
7: for i = 1 to |A| do
8: Pick g ∈ arg maxj∈G{vi(Pi ∪ {j})− vi(Pi)}.
9: Pi ← Pi ∪ {g}, G← G \ {g}
10: end for
11: end while
12: return partition P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn).
3.2 Multilinear Extensions and Expected Marginals
Our analysis of ROUNDROBIN rests on studying the multilinear extension of the valuation func-
tions. This concept has been used in recent results for constrained submodular maximization; see,
e.g. [CCPV11, Von08, KST09, LMNS10, Von13, CVZ10, CVZ14]. Formally,
Definition 3 (Multilinear Extension). For a function f : 2[m] → R, the multilinear extension F :
[0, 1][m] → R is defined as follows:
F (x) := ER∼x[f(R)] =
∑
R⊆[m]
f(R)
∏
i∈R
xi
∏
i∈([m]\R)
(1− xi)
 .
Here sampling from x ∈ [0, 1]m corresponds to selecting a random subset R ⊆ [m] in which each j ∈ [m]
appears independently with probability xj .
We say an n-tuple χ := (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with xi ∈ [0, 1]m is a fractional allocation iff ∑ni=1 xij ≤ 1
∀ j ∈ [m]. A binary fractional allocation corresponds to a (partial) allocation. Also, note that the
set of all fractional allocations forms a partition matroid polytope over the set [m]. Next we state
and prove a useful property of the uniform fractional allocation.
Lemma 4 (Proportionality). Let vi : 2[m] → R+ denote nonnegative, monotone, submodular valuations
of agents i ∈ [n] over m goods. Then, the fractional allocation ω = (u1, u2, . . . , un)—in which ui :=
( 1n ,
1
n , . . . ,
1
n) ∈ [0, 1]m for all i ∈ [n]—satisfies Vi(ui) ≥
(
1− 1e
)
µi for all i ∈ [n]. Here Vi : [0, 1]m → R+
is the multilinear extension of vi and µi is the maximin share of agent i.
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Proof. Let f : 2[m] → R+ be a nonnegative, monotone, submodular valuation function. Further-
more, for a fractional allocation χ = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), write F(χ) to denote expected social welfare
of n agents with identical valuation function f , i.e.,
F(χ) :=
n∑
i=1
F (xi)
=
n∑
i=1
ERi∼xi [f(Ri)].
Here, xi ∈ [0, 1]m and F is the multilinear extension of f .
Vondrak [Von08] (see remark 2 on pg. 6) established that under the uniform fractional alloca-
tion ω = (u1, u2, . . . , un) the expected social welfare under is at least (1− e−1) times the optimal:
F(ω) ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
max
(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn(m)
n∑
i=1
f(Pi) (6)
Write (M∗1 , . . . ,M∗n) to denote a partition that achieves the maximin share with respect to f ,
i.e., (M∗1 , . . . ,M∗n) ∈ arg max(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn(m) mini∈[n] f(Pi). In addition, let µ be the maximin share;
hence, µ = mini∈[n] f(M∗i )
Using the fact that ui = uj for all i, j ∈ [n] we have the following bound for the multilinear
extension F .
F (ui) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
F (uj)
=
1
n
F(ω)
≥ 1
n
(
1− 1
e
)
max
(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn(m)
n∑
i=1
f(Pi) (via inequality (6))
≥ 1
n
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
f(M∗i )
≥ 1
n
(
1− 1
e
)
nµ
Therefore, we have F (ui) ≥ (1− 1e)µ. We can simply instantiate this inequality for each valu-
ation function vi to obtain the stated claim that Vi(ui) ≥ (1− 1e )µi, for all i ∈ [n].
Recall that fH denotes the marginal function with respect to subset H ⊆ [m], fH(S) := f(H ∪
S)− f(H) for all S ⊆ [m]. Write FH to denote the multilinear extension of fH .
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We define xS to be the projection of a vector x ∈ [0, 1]m onto S ⊆ [m].
xSj :=
{
xj if j ∈ S
0 otherwise
In addition, we will say that a vector y is supported over a set S iff the set of nonzero compo-
nents of y is equal to S. Hence, for u := ( 1n ,
1
n , . . . ,
1
n) ∈ [0, 1]m and S ⊆ [m], the projection vector
uS ∈ [0, 1]m is supported over S. In addition, the probability of drawing a subset R from uS is
nonzero iff R ⊆ S.
The following property of multilinear extensions will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.
Proposition 2. Given a monotone, submodular function f : 2[m] → R+ along with subset P ⊆ [m], good
g ∈ [m], and vector x ∈ [0, 1]m, the multilinear extensions of the marginal functions satisfy FP∪{g}(x) ≥
FP (x)− fP (g).
Proof. For any R ⊆ [m], by definition of the marginal function, we have
fP∪{g}(R) = f(R ∪ P ∪ {g})− f(P ∪ {g})
≥ f(R ∪ P )− f(P ∪ {g}) (monotonicity of f )
= [f(R ∪ P )− f(P )]− [f(P ∪ {g})− f(P )]
= fP (R)− fP (g)
Taking expectation with respect to x (i.e., drawing R ∼ x) we get the stated claim FP∪{g}(x) ≥
FP (x)− fP (g).
For the analysis of the algorithm, we will define the notion of expected ordered marginals γjs.
This notion represents the (expected) marginal of a good j ∈ J ⊆ [m] with respect to the goods in
J that have a lower index than j, i.e., the marginal of j with respect to the set S = {j′ ∈ J | j′ < j}.
The point is that we take expectation with respect to random draws of S. These marginals can be
used to “locally” express the multilinear extension in a linear form; see Proposition 3, and they
might be of independent interest.
Formally, given sets J,H ⊆ [m], good j ∈ [m] and x ∈ [0, 1]m, write
γH,Jj (x) := ER∼x
[
f(H ∪ (R∩{j′∈J |j′<j}))(j)
]
. (7)
The multilinear extension of a function can be expressed in terms of these marginals as follows.
Proposition 3. Given subsets J,H ⊆ [m] and a vector x ∈ [0, 1]m supported over J , the multilinear
extension, FH , of the submodular function fH satisfies
FH(x) =
∑
j∈J
γH,Jj (x) xj
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Proof. Consider the goods in set J = {j1, j2, . . . , jk} such that j1 < j2 < · · · < jk, and let Ji denote
the set of goods in J that have a lower index than ji, i.e., Ji := J ∩ [ji−1] = {j1, j2, . . . , ji−1}. Also,
let J0 denote the empty set.
For any subset R ⊆ J , the definition of the marginal function implies that
fH(R) = f(H ∪R)− f(H)
=
k∑
i=1
f (H ∪ (R ∩ Ji))− f (H ∪ (R ∩ Ji−1)) (telescoping sum)
=
k∑
i=1
f(H ∪ (R∩Ji−1))(ji) 1(ji ∈ R).
Here 1(j ∈ R) is the indicator function of R. Note that x is supported over J and the above
equality holds for all R ⊆ J , hence, taking expectation we get
FH(x) = ER∼x [fH(R)]
=
k∑
i=1
ER∼x [f(H∪[R∩Ji−1])(ji) 1(ji ∈ R)]
=
k∑
i=1
ER∼x [f(H∪[R∩Ji−1])(ji)] ER∼x[1(ji ∈ R)] (x is a product distribution)
=
∑
j∈J
γH,Jj (x) xj
Next we state a useful property of the expected ordered marginals.
Proposition 4. Let H ⊆ [m] and x ∈ [0, 1]m. Then, for subsets J ′ ⊆ J ⊆ [m] and j ∈ J ′, the expected
ordered marginals are monotonic
γH,J
′
j (x
J ′) ≥ γH,Jj (xJ)
Proof. By definition,
γH,J
′
j (x
J ′) = ER∼xJ′ [fH∪(R∩{j′∈J ′|j′<j})(j)]
=
∑
R⊆J ′
fH∪(R∩{j′∈J ′|j′<j})(j)
∏
i∈R
xi
∏
k∈J ′\R
(1− xk)
Suppose we are pickingR′ ⊆ [m] from the distribution xJ\J ′ , then from our definition of projec-
tion we know thatR′ ⊆ J \J ′. Hence,∑R′⊆J\J ′∏i′∈R′ xi′∏k′∈(J\J ′)\R′(1−xk′) = PrR′∼xJ\J′ [R′ ⊆
J \ J ′] = 1. Using this with the above equality, we get:
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γH,J
′
j (x
J ′) =
∑
R⊆J ′
fH∪(R∩{j′∈J ′|j′<j})(j)
∏
i∈R
xi
∏
k∈J ′\R
(1− xk)
∑
R′⊆J\J ′
∏
i′∈R′
xi′
∏
k′∈(J\J ′)\R′
(1− xk′)
=
∑
R⊆J ′,R′⊆J\J ′
fH∪(R∩{j′∈J ′|j′<j})(j)
∏
i∈R∪R′
xi
∏
k∈J\(R∪R′)
(1− xk)
Since R′ ∩ J ′ = ∅, we can write the above equality as:
γH,J
′
j (x
J ′) =
∑
R⊆J
fH∪(R∩{j′∈J ′|j′<j})(j)
∏
i∈R
xi
∏
k∈J\R
(1− xk)
= ER∼xJ [fH∪(R∩{j′∈J ′|j′<j})(j)]
Now from submodularity of f , since J ′ ⊆ J , we know that for allH,R ⊆ [m]: fH∪(R∩{j′∈J ′|j′<j})(j) ≥
fH∪(R∩{j′∈J |j′<j})(j). Hence we have:
γH,J
′
j (x
J ′) = ER∼xJ [fH∪(R∩{j′∈J ′|j′<j})(j)]
≥ ER∼xJ [fH∪(R∩{j′∈J |j′<j})(j)]
= γH,Jj (x
J) (by definition)
3.3 Proof of Lemma 3
In the proof we will fix an agent i and—under the assumption that τi ≤ µi—establish the stated
claim, vi(Pi) ≥ 110τi, for i; an analogous argument establishes the claim for all other agents.
If agent i was assigned a good in the first while-loop of ROUNDROBIN (Algorithm 3), then
we have the desired inequality vi(Pi) ≥ 110τi. Else, the first while-loop of Algorithm 3 terminates
with, say, the good set G = {1, 2, . . . , |G|} (denoting the set of unallocated goods) and agent set
A = {1, 2, . . . , |A|} (denoting the set of agents who have not been allocated a single good yet).
Let µ̂i be agent i’s maximin share in this reduced instance, µ̂i := max(B1,...,B|A|)∈Π|A|(G) minj∈[|A|] vi(Bj).
Next we will show that µ̂i ≥ µi and vi(Pi) ≥ 110 µ̂i. Since we are working under the assump-
tion that τi ≤ µi, establishing an approximation guarantee in terms of µ̂i (i.e., finding a |A|-
partition (P1, . . . , P|A|) of G such that vi(Pi) ≥ 1/10µ̂i for all i ∈ A) will prove the lemma. Let
M∗ = (M∗1 , . . . ,M∗n) denote a partition that achieves the maximin share with respect to vi in the
original instance: M∗ ∈ arg max(B1,...,Bn)∈Πn(m) minj∈[n] vi(Bj). Since |[m] \ G| = n − |A|, there
are at most n− |A| subsets M∗j s which intersect with [m] \G. In other words, there are at least |A|
bundles inM∗ that are completely contained in G. Recall that vi(M∗j ) ≥ µi for all j ∈ [n] and vi
is monotone. Hence, we can partition G into |A| sets, say (M1, . . . ,M|A|), such that vi(Mj) ≥ µi
for all j ∈ [|A|]. This proves that µ̂i ≥ µi. Therefore, in the rest of the proof we focus only on the
reduced instance and, with slight abuse of notation, set n = |A| and m = |G|.
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We will now analyze the second while-loop of Algorithm 3, which allocates the goods in G to
agents in A. A complete execution of the inner for-loop (Steps 8-11) will be called a round. So, in
every round, each agent i is allocated exactly one good.17
In the remainder of the proof, f will be used to denote vi and F to denote the multilinear
relaxation of f . Write µ to denote µ̂i and u ∈ [0, 1]m to denote the uniform vector
(
1
n ,
1
n , . . . ,
1
n
)
.
For a particular round r (i.e., for the rth iteration of the inner for-loop): we will use P to denote
goods allocated to the agent i before round r, G to denote the unallocated goods before round r,
g to denote the good allocated to agent i in the round r, and L to denote the set of goods allocated
during r.18
Also, define the maximum (expected ordered) marginal lost by the agent in round r as
`r := max
j∈L
γP,Gj (u
G).
Recall that uG corresponds to the projection of u onto the set G. We begin by establishing the
following inequality for all rounds r:
FP (u
G\L) ≥ FP (uG)− `r (8)
Specifically, Propostion 3 (and the fact that uG\L is supported over G \ L) gives us
FP (u
G\L) =
∑
j∈G\L
γ
P,G\L
j (u
G\L)
1
n
≥
∑
j∈G\L
γP,Gj (u
G)
1
n
(via Proposition 4; G \ L ⊆ G)
=
∑
j∈G
γP,Gj (u
G)
1
n
−
∑
j∈L
γP,Gj (u
G)
1
n
≥ FP (uG)− `r (using Proposition 3 and the definition of `r)
With a fixed constant α > 1, define potential φr, for round r, as φr := max{αfP (g), `r}. The
following lemma shows that the “loss” incurred in the multilinear relaxation (due to the allocation
of the set L) can be balanced by the potential φr.
Lemma 5. For any round r,
FP∪{g}(uG\L) +
(
1 +
1
α
)
φr ≥ FP (uG)
17Without loss of generality, we can assume that the number of goods in G is a multiple of |A|. We can do this by
adding dummy goods of value 0.
18The set of unallocated goods after round r is equal to G \ L and after the round the bundle allocated to the agent
gets updated to P ∪ {g}. Also, note that, by definition, g ∈ L.
21
Proof. The definition of φr implies that
FP∪{g}(uG\L) +
(
1 +
1
α
)
φr ≥ FP∪{g}(uG\L) + fP (g) + `r
≥ FP (uG\L) + `r (via Proposition 2; setting x = uG\L)
≥ FP (uG) (using inequality (8))
Using this potential, we partition all the rounds into two sets: write D to denote the set of
“decrementing” rounds, D := {r | φr = `r}, and I to denote the set of “incrementing” rounds as
I = {r | φr > `r}. Proposition 5 bounds the loss incurred in decrementing rounds.
Proposition 5. The total loss incurred in decrementing rounds is upper bounded as follows∑
r∈D
`r ≤ 0.1
1− 1α
µ.
Proof. We will prove that the `r values drop geometrically across decrementing rounds. In partic-
ular, consider two decrementing rounds r1, r2 ∈ D such that r1 < r2 (round r2 was after round r1)
and there are no decrementing rounds between the two. Write Prk to denote the bundle allocated
to the agent before round rk, for k ∈ {1, 2} and, similarly, Grk to denote the set of unallocated
before round rk, grk for the good allocated to the agent during round rk, and Lrk for the entire set
of goods allocated during rk.
The fact that good gr1 was greedily selected to have the largest marginal implies that fPr1 (gr1) ≥
fPr1 (j) for all j ∈ Gr2 ⊆ Gr1 \ Lr1 . Therefore, using the containment Pr1 ⊂ Pr2 and the submodu-
larity of f we get
fPr1 (gr1) ≥ fPr2 (j) for all j ∈ Gr2
Note that, for all j ∈ Gr2 , the expected ordered marginals, γPr2 ,Gr2j (uGr2 ), are upper bounded
by fPr2 (j). Therefore, `r2 ≤ fPr1 (gr1) and we have
`r1 ≥ αfPr1 (gr1) ( since r1 ∈ D)
≥ α`r2 .
Hence, we get that the `rs of decrementing rounds drop geometrically. Furthermore, note that
`s ≤ 0.1µ, where s is the first decrementing round. This follows from the underlying assumption
(which asserts that the input threshold, τ , for the agent satisfies τ ≤ µ) and the fact that all goods
that have large marginals (and hence values greater than 110τ ) were removed in the first while loop
of the algorithm.
Therefore, the stated claim follows:
∑
r∈D `r ≤ 11− 1
α
`s ≤ 0.11− 1
α
µ.
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We can now prove Lemma 3. Using Lemma 5 we get the following lower bound on the sum
of the potentials (
1 +
1
α
)∑
r
φr ≥
∑
r
FP (u
G)− FP∪{g}(uG\L)
≥ F (u) (telescoping sum)
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
µ (via Lemma 4).
Since a round is either incrementing or decrementing, we can write
∑
r φr =
∑
r∈D φr +∑
r∈I φr. Therefore, (
1 +
1
α
)∑
r∈I
φr ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
µ−
(
1 +
1
α
)∑
r∈D
φr.
Recall that φr = `r for all r ∈ D. Hence, Proposition 5 gives us
∑
r∈I
φr ≥
(
1− e−1
1 + α−1
)
µ−
(
0.1
1− α−1
)
µ.
Let P̂ be the final set of goods allocated to agent i. The fact that for all incrementing rounds the
potential φr is equal to α times the marginal gain of the agent, i.e., φr = αfP (g) for all r ∈ I, gives
the upper bound αf(P̂ ) ≥ ∑r∈I φr. Therefore, the final bundle allocated to the agent satisfies
f(P̂ ) ≥ 1α
(
1−e−1
1+α−1 − 0.11−α−1
)
µ.
To recap, we have proved that when agent i is assigned a good in the first while-loop of
ROUNDROBIN, then agent i gets a high valued good; i.e., f(P̂ ) ≥ 0.1τi.
When agent i is not assigned a good in the first while-loop of ROUNDROBIN, then ROUNDROBIN
terminates with f(P̂ ) ≥ 1α
(
1−e−1
1+α−1 − 0.11−α−1
)
µ. Therefore, setting α = 1 +
√
2 we get f(P̂ ) ≥ 0.1µ.
Overall, the condition that τi ≤ µ implies the desired inequality—f(P̂ ) ≥ 0.1τi—in this case as
well.
3.4 Proof of Theorem 3
In ALGSUB the initial value of τi (= vi([m])) is guaranteed to be at least µi. Furthermore, Lemma 3
ensures that, for each agent i, ALGSUB never decrements τi below 11+δµi. Therefore, when ALGSUB
terminates, for every agent i, the final threshold value τi satisfies τi ≥ 11+δµi and vi(Pi) ≥ 110τi
(since V = ∅ at termination). In other words, ALGSUB returns a partition (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) which
satisfies vi(Pi) ≥ 110(1+δ)µi for all i ∈ [n] and, hence, satisfies the desired approximate fairness
guarantee. Note that we can tighten the analysis of Lemma 3 to obtain an approximation factor
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Algorithm 4 Computation of an approximate maximin fair allocations ALGSUB
Input: An instance withm goods and n agents, whose valuations, vi : 2[m] → R+, are nonnegative,
monotone and submodular.
Output: An allocation P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) such that, vi(Pi) ≥ 110(1+δ)µi for all i ∈ [n].
Here µi is the n-maximin share of agent i and δ ∈ (0, 1) is an arbitrarily small constant.
1: For all i ∈ [n], initialize τi = vi([m]) and Pi = ∅. {We assume that µi > 0 for each agent i; agents
that do not satisfy this assumption can be simply detected and removed from consideration.}
2: Initialize V = {i | vi(Pi) < 110τi}, i.e., V = [n].
3: while V 6= ∅ do
4: For all i ∈ V , update τi ← 1(1+δ)τi.
5: Update the partition by executing ROUNDROBIN with the current threshold values:
(P1, P2, . . . , Pn)← ROUNDROBIN(τ1, . . . , τn).
6: Update V ← {i | vi(Pi) < 110τi}
7: end while
8: return Partition P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn)
slightly better than 110 .
19 Hence, with an appropriately small constant δ ∈ (0, 1), we can obtain
the approximation guarantee of 1/10 (as stated in Theorem 3), instead of the slightly worse bound
1
10(1+δ) .
Finally, we can bound the running time of ALGSUB by observing that initially τi = vi([m])
and, hence, the maximum number of times that agent i is contained in set V is log(1+δ)
(
vi([m])
µi
)
.20
Overall, this bound ensures that the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
4 Conclusions
The algorithms developed in this paper find allocations that are not only (approximately) fair
but also sequenceable. Sequenceable allocations are allocations that can be obtained by ordering
the agents and then letting them select their most valued unallocated good one after the other;
see [BK05] for a formal definition. Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [BL16b] have studied this notion as an
efficiency measure and shown that every Pareto-optimal allocation is also sequenceable. This ob-
servation leads to the open, interesting question of whether we can efficiently compute allocations
which are both (approximately) fair and Pareto optimal.
In a recent preprint Ghodsi et al. [GHS+17] have also obtained constant-factor approximation
guarantees for maximin fair division under additive and submodular valuations. In addition, they
consider more general valuation functions; specifically, they obtain a constant-factor approxima-
tion for XOS valuations and a logarithmic approximation for subadditive valuations. Understand-
ing if the ideas developed in this paper—along with [GHS+17], [PW14], and [AMNS15]—can be
19We did not optimize the parameters for ease of presentation.
20As stated in the algorithm, agents whose maximin share is zero can be removed from consideration.
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used to address fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents remains an interesting
direction for future work.
References
[AGGW17] H. Aziz, Rauchecker, G., Schryen, G., and T. Walsh. Approximation algorithms for
max-min share allocations of indivisible chores and goods. Proceedings of the Thirty-
First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017. 4, 5, 31
[AKS14] Chidambaram Annamalai, Christos Kalaitzis, and Ola Svensson. Combinatorial algo-
rithm for restricted max-min fair allocation. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1357–1372. SIAM, 2014. 5
[AMNS15] G. Amanatidis, E. Markakis, A. Nikzad, and A. Saberi. Approximation algorithms for
computing maximin share allocations. Proceedings of the 42nd International Colloquium
on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), 2015. 2, 3, 4, 24
[AS10] Arash Asadpour and Amin Saberi. An approximation algorithm for max-min fair
allocation of indivisible goods. SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(7):2970–2989, 2010. 5
[BCKO16] Eric Budish, Ge´rard P Cachon, Judd B Kessler, and Abraham Othman. Course match:
A large-scale implementation of approximate competitive equilibrium from equal in-
comes for combinatorial allocation. Operations Research, 2016. 5
[BD05] Ivona Beza´kova´ and Varsha Dani. Allocating indivisible goods. ACM SIGecom Ex-
changes, 5(3):11–18, 2005. 5
[BK05] Steven J Brams and Daniel L King. Efficient fair division: help the worst off or avoid
envy? Rationality and Society, 17(4):387–421, 2005. 24
[BL16a] Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaıˆtre. Characterizing conflicts in fair division of
indivisible goods using a scale of criteria. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,
30(2):259–290, 2016. 2, 3, 4, 7
[BL16b] Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lematre. Efficiency and sequenceability in fair division
of indivisible goods with additive preferences. In Proceedings of the Sixth International
Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC’16), 2016. 24
[BS06] Nikhil Bansal and Maxim Sviridenko. The Santa Claus problem. In Proceedings of the
thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 31–40. ACM, 2006.
5
[BT96] Steven J Brams and Alan D Taylor. Fair Division: From cake-cutting to dispute resolution.
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 1, 4, 5
25
[Bud11] Eric Budish. The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equi-
librium from equal incomes. Journal of Political Economy, 119(6):1061–1103, 2011. 2, 4,
6
[CCK09] Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Julia Chuzhoy, and Sanjeev Khanna. On allocating goods
to maximize fairness. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2009. FOCS’09. 50th Annual
IEEE Symposium on, pages 107–116. IEEE, 2009. 5
[CCPV11] Gruia Calinescu, Chandra Chekuri, Martin Pa´l, and Jan Vondra´k. Maximizing a
monotone submodular function subject to a matroid constraint. SIAM Journal on Com-
puting, 2011. 16
[CKM+16] Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Herve´ Moulin, Ariel D Procaccia, Nisarg
Shah, and Junxing Wang. The unreasonable fairness of maximum nash welfare. In
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 305–322.
ACM, 2016. 2, 7
[CV09] Chandra Chekuri and Jan Vondra´k. Randomized pipage rounding for matroid poly-
topes and applications. CoRR, abs/0909.4348, 2009. 4
[CVZ10] Chandra Chekuri, Jan Vondra´k, and Rico Zenklusen. Dependent randomized round-
ing via exchange properties of combinatorial structures. In Foundations of Computer
Science (FOCS), 2010 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 575–584. IEEE, 2010. 16
[CVZ14] Chandra Chekuri, Jan Vondra´k, and Rico Zenklusen. Submodular function maxi-
mization via the multilinear relaxation and contention resolution schemes. SIAM
Journal on Computing, 43(6):1831–1879, 2014. 16
[Fei08] Uriel Feige. On allocations that maximize fairness. In Proceedings of the nineteenth
annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 287–293. Society for Indus-
trial and Applied Mathematics, 2008. 5
[FNW78] Marshall L Fisher, George L Nemhauser, and Laurence A Wolsey. An analysis of ap-
proximations for maximizing submodular set functions-ii. In Polyhedral combinatorics,
pages 73–87. Springer, 1978. 29
[GHIM09] Michel X Goemans, Nicholas JA Harvey, Satoru Iwata, and Vahab Mirrokni. Ap-
proximating submodular functions everywhere. In Proceedings of the twentieth annual
ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 535–544. Society for Industrial
and Applied Mathematics, 2009. 5
[GHS+17] Mohammad Ghodsi, MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi, Masoud Seddighin, Saeed Sed-
dighin, and Hadi Yami. Fair allocation of indivisible goods: Improvement and gener-
alization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.00222, 2017. 24
[GP14] J. Goldman, and A. D. Procaccia. Spliddit: Unleashing fair division algorithms. SIGe-
com Exchanges, 2014. 5
26
[Gra66] Ronald L Graham. Bounds for certain multiprocessing anomalies. Bell Labs Technical
Journal, 45(9):1563–1581, 1966. 33
[KPW16] David Kurokawa, Ariel D Procaccia, and Junxing Wang. When can the maximin share
guarantee be guaranteed? In Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 523–529. AAAI Press, 2016. 2, 4
[KST09] Ariel Kulik, Hadas Shachnai, and Tami Tamir. Maximizing submodular set functions
subject to multiple linear constraints. In Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 545–554. Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics, 2009. 16
[LJ83] Hendrik W Lenstra Jr. Integer programming with a fixed number of variables. Math-
ematics of operations research, 8(4):538–548, 1983. 3
[LMMS04] Richard J Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, and Amin Saberi. On ap-
proximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM confer-
ence on Electronic commerce, pages 125–131. ACM, 2004. 3, 9, 32
[LMNS10] Jon Lee, Vahab S Mirrokni, Viswanath Nagarajan, and Maxim Sviridenko. Maxi-
mizing nonmonotone submodular functions under matroid or knapsack constraints.
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 23(4):2053–2078, 2010. 16
[MBC+16] Herve´ Moulin, Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Ariel D Procaccia, and
Je´roˆme Lang. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press,
2016. 4
[Mou90] Herve´ Moulin. Uniform externalities: Two axioms for fair allocation. Journal of Public
Economics, 43(3):305–326, 1990. 2
[Mou04] Herve´ Moulin. Fair division and collective welfare. MIT press, 2004. 1, 4
[Mou14] Herve´ Moulin. Cooperative microeconomics: a game-theoretic introduction. Princeton
University Press, 2014. 4
[NWF78] George L Nemhauser, Laurence A Wolsey, and Marshall L Fisher. An analysis of ap-
proximations for maximizing submodular set functionsi. Mathematical Programming,
14(1):265–294, 1978. 29
[PW14] Ariel D Procaccia and Junxing Wang. Fair enough: Guaranteeing approximate max-
imin shares. pages 675–692, 2014. 2, 3, 4, 24
[Ste48] Hugo Steinhaus. The problem of fair division. Econometrica, 16(1), 1948. 1
[Von08] Jan Vondra´k. Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the
value oracle model. In Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, pages 67–74. ACM, 2008. 3, 16, 17, 29
27
[Von13] Jan Vondra´k. Symmetry and approximability of submodular maximization problems.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 42(1):265–304, 2013. 16
[Woe97] Gerhard J Woeginger. A polynomial-time approximation scheme for maximizing the
minimum machine completion time. Operations Research Letters, 20(4):149–154, 1997.
3
[Wu05] Bang Ye Wu. An analysis of the lpt algorithm for the max–min and the min–ratio
partition problems. Theoretical computer science, 349(3):407–419, 2005. 10, 13
A Approximating the Maximin Share
This section presents a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for computing the maximin
share of an agent whose valuation function is nonnegative, monotone, and submodular.21 Note
that maximin fair allocation are guaranteed to exist when all the agents have the same valuation
function. Hence, in particular, the algorithm developed will efficiently computes a 19 -approximate
maximin fair allocation under identical submodular valuations.
Theorem 4 (Approximate Maximin Share). Given a nonnegative, monotone, submodular valuation
function v : 2[m] → R+. In polynomial time, we can find a partition (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) ∈ Πn(m) such that
v(Pi) ≥ 19µ for all i ∈ [n]. Here, µ is the n-maximin share of the valuation function v over the set of goods
[m].
Proof. We present an algorithm that, given a threshold τ ∈ R+ as input and oracle access to the
valuation function v, computes an n-partition (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) such that v(Pj) ≥ τ/9 (for all j ∈ [n])
as long as τ ≤ µ. Hence, we can use this algorithm along with a standard binary search to find an
n-partition that satisfies the theorem statement.
Define the set of high-valued goods H := {j | v({j}) ≥ τ9}. If |H| ≥ n, we return a partition
(P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Πn(m) such that every bundle contains at least one good from H . Therefore, by
monotonicity of v, we would get v(Pi) ≥ τ/9 for all i ∈ [n].
On the other hand, if |H| < n, we will allocate the goods in H to |H| different bundles; there-
fore, each of these bundles will be of value at least τ/9. To complete the argument for the remain-
ing n − |H| bundles, in the remainder of the proof we will show how to compute an (n − |H|)-
partition of the goods in [m] \H , such that each of these bundles is also of value at least τ/9.
Assuming τ ≤ µ, first we will prove that there exists a (2(n− |H|))-partition of [m] \H , where
each bundle in the partition has a value of at least 4τ/9.
Consider an allocationM∗ = (M∗1 ,M∗2 , . . . ,M∗n) that achieves the maximin share, i.e., M∗ ∈
arg max(M1,...,Mn)∈Πn(m) min1≤i≤n v(Mi). At least n − |H| sets inM∗ satisfy M∗i ∩H = ∅. Hence,
without loss of generality, we assume that M∗j ∩H = ∅ for all j ∈ [n− |H|].
Since τ ≤ µ, each set M∗j (such that j ∈ [n − |H|]) can be further partitioned into two sets
(Aj , Bj) ∈ Π2(M∗j ), such that min{v(Aj), v(Bj)} ≥ 4τ/9.
21The problem of (exactly) computing the maximin share is NP-hard—even for additive valuations and two agents—
since the Partition problem reduces to it.
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The following iterative method leads to such a partition (Aj , Bj): (i) Initialize (Aj , Bj) ←
(∅,M∗j ); (ii) While v(Aj) < 4τ/9 and Bj 6= ∅: Pick g ∈ Bj , update (Aj , Bj)← (Aj ∪ {g}, Bj \ {g}).
When this method terminates we have v(Aj) ≥ 4τ/9. Let g be the last good transferred to Aj
from Bj . Note that g ∈ M∗j ⊆ [m] \H , hence v(g) < τ/9. Therefore, from submodularity of v, we
have v(Aj) ≤ v(Aj \ {g}) + v({g}) < 5τ/9. Hence, v(Bj) ≥ v(M∗j ) − v(Aj) ≥ µ − 5τ/9 ≥ 4τ/9.
Therefore, a (2(n− |H|))-partition, where each bundle gets a value of at least 4τ/9, is guaranteed
to exist.
Next we set up a submodular maximization problem under a matroid constraint which pro-
vides the desired partition. Specifically, we define a matroid over the universe of tuples U :=
([m]\H)× [2(n−|H|)] as follows: For all j ∈ [m]\H , define setBj := {(j, k) | 1 ≤ k ≤ 2(n−|H|)}.
Consider the partition matroid defined by the following collection of subsets I := {I ⊆ U |
|I ∩Bj | ≤ 1 for all j ∈ [m] \H}. Note that I corresponds to the set of all (partial) allocations.
We will construct a submodular function, g, over the universe U . In particular function g :
2U → R+, is defined to be g(S) :=
∑2(n−|H|)
k=1 min{4τ/9, v(Sk)}, where Sk = {j|(j, k) ∈ S} for
k ∈ [2(n− |H|)].
Note that g is a nonnegative, monotone, submodular function. Hence, we can approximately
maximize it over the partition matroid (U, I); see [Von08, NWF78, FNW78]. In other words, in
polynomial time, we can find an independent set I ∈ I such that g(I) ≥ (1− 1e ) maxS∈I g(S).
When τ ≤ µ we showed the existence of a (2(n − |H|))-partition of [m] \ H , wherein each
bundle gets a value of atleast 4τ/9. Hence, if τ ≤ µ, we have that maxS∈I g(S) ≥ 2(n − |H|)4τ9 .
Therefore, the obtained set I satisfies g(I) ≥ (1− 1e )2(n− |H|)4τ9 .
Note that if g(I) < 89(1− 1e )(n− |H|)τ , then we know that τ > µ and the algorithm can report
that the bound τ ≤ µ is not met. In the remainder of the proof we assume the complementary case
wherein g(I) satisfies the above mentioned lower bound.
For independent set I ∈ I, write Ik := {j | (j, k) ∈ I} and, without loss of generality, assume
v(I1) ≥ v(I2) ≥ . . . ≥ v(I2(n−|H|)). Since I ∈ I, the definition of I ensures that any good j ∈ [m]\H
appears in at most one set (bundle) Ik. That is, (I1, I2, . . . , I2(n−|H||)) forms a (2(n− |H|)) partition
of [m] \H . Furthermore, g(I) ≥ 89(1− 1e )(n− |H|)τ implies that
2(n−|H|)∑
i=1
min {4τ/9, v(Ii)} ≥ 8
9
(
1− 1
e
)
(n− |H|)τ (9)
We will use inequality (9) to show that (n− |H|) bundles, I1, I2, . . . , I(n−|H|), satisfy v(Ij) ≥ τ9 .
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Since the bundles are ordered such that v(I1) ≥ v(I2) ≥ . . . ≥ v(I2(n−|H|)), we have
(n− |H|+ 1)v(In−|H|) ≥
2(n−|H|)∑
i=n−|H|
v(Ii)
≥ 8
9
(
1− 1
e
)
(n− |H|)τ −
n−|H|−1∑
i=1
min {4τ/9, v(Ii)} (using inequality (9))
≥ 8
9
(
1− 1
e
)
(n− |H|)τ − (n− |H| − 1|)4τ
9
.
Hence, v(In−|H|) ≥ 4τ9 (1− 2e ) ≥ τ9 . The stated claim that the (n−|H|) bundles I1, I2, . . . , I(n−|H|)
have high value follows from the fact that v(I1) ≥ v(I2) ≥ . . . ≥ v(In−|H|).
Overall, using the independent set found via the matroid-constrained optimization, I ∈ I,
the algorithm can output P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn−|H|) = (I1, I2, . . . , In−|H|−1,∪2(n−|H|)k=n−|H|Ik). The mono-
tonicity of v ensures that v(Pi) ≥ τ9 for all i ∈ [(n − |H|)]. That is, P satisfies the theorem state-
ment.
B Fair Division of Chores
In this section we study the fair division of chores (negatively valued goods) under additive valu-
ations.
B.1 Notation and Preliminaries
Notations here are similar to the ones used in Section 2. Write [n] to denote the set of agents and
[m] to denote the set of indivisible chores. The valuation function of an agent i for a subset of
chores S ⊆ [m] is denoted by vi(S). We assume that agents have additive valuations. That is for
any agent i
vi(S) =
∑
j∈S
vi(j).
Since we are allocating chores among the agents, we will assume that the valuation of any
chore is non-positive. That is vi(j) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m].
Our fairness guarantee is in terms of maximin shares. Formally,
Definition 4 (Maximin Share). For an agent i ∈ [n] and a subset of chores S ⊆ [m], the n-maximin share
is defined to be:
µni (S) := max
(M1,M2,...,Mn)∈Πn(S)
min
k∈[n]
vi(Mk). (10)
Ideally, we would like to ensure fairness by partitioning the chores such that each agent gets
her maximin share, i.e., partition the chores into subsets (A1, A2, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(m) such that
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vi(Ai) ≥ µi for all i ∈ [n]. Since such partitions do not always exist [AGGW17], a natural goal
is to study approximation guarantees. In particular, our objective is to develop efficient algo-
rithms that determine a partition (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(m) wherein each agent, i, gets a bundle, Ai,
of value (under vi) at least α times her maximin share, with α ∈ [1,∞) being as small as possible.
We call such partitions as α-approximate maximin fair allocations. When α = 1, we say that the
allocation is maximin fair. Observe that in this case, our approximation factors are greater than 1.
This is because, in this case, the maximin shares are non-positive.
In particular, we present an efficient algorithm that finds 4/3 approximate maximin fair allo-
cation of chores. Hence improving upon the 2 approximation bound of [AGGW17].
B.2 Approximation Guarantee for Chores
Using techniques similar to the case of goods, we prove an approximate maximin shares guarantee
for fair division of chores with additive valuations.
Theorem 5 (Main Result for Chores). Given a set of n agents that have additive valuations, {vi}i∈[n],
for a set of m indivisible chores (i.e., vi(j) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]), we can find a partition
(A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(m) in polynomial time that satisfies
vi(Ai) ≥ 4n− 1
3n
µi ∀i ∈ [n]. (11)
The proof of theorem 5 proceeds in two parts:
(i) First, we observe that the problem of finding a partition that provides approximate maximin
fair allocations can be reduced to a restricted setting where the agents value the chores in
the same order. This follows from the fact that the arguments used in Section 2.1 do not
use the fact that the goods are positively valued. It only uses the additivity property of the
valuations. Hence, the m chores can be ordered (indexed), say g1, g2, . . . , gm, such that the
valuation of every agent i respects this ordering: for each a < b we have vi(ga) ≤ vi(gb).
(ii) Then, we develop a 4/3-approximation algorithm for this restricted setting.
B.3 Envy Graph Algorithm for Chores
As we only need to address the setting in which the agents value the chores in the same order.
Hence, throughout this section we solely focus on ordered instances wherein the chores are in-
dexed, say g1, g2, . . . , gm, such that for every agent iwe have vi(ga) ≤ vi(gb) (i.e., |vi(ga)| ≥ |vi(gb)|),
for all indices a < b. Specifically, the approximation algorithm iteratively allocates the chores in
increasing order of their indices and maintains a partial allocation,A = (A1, . . . , An), of the chores
assigned so far. In order to assign a chore the algorithm selects a bundle, Ai, by considering a
directed graph, G(A), that captures the envy between agents. The nodes in this envy graph repre-
sent the agents and it contains a directed edge from i to j iff i envies j, i.e., vi(Ai) < vi(Aj).
We restate Lemma 1, for the case of chores (The same proof works for the case of chores).
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Lemma 6 ( [LMMS04]). Given a partial allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) of a subset of chores S ∈ [m], we
can find another partial allocation B = (B1, . . . , Bn) of S in polynomial time such that
(i) The valuations of agents for their bundles do not decrease: vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ [n].
(ii) The envy graph G(B) is acyclic.
Algorithm 5 Envy Graph Algorithm ALGCHORES
Input : n agents, m chores, and valuations vij for each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]. In the given instance,
the agents value the chores in the same order.
Output: An allocation that provides approximate maximin guarantee.
1: Order the chores, g1, g2, . . . , gm, such that for every agent i ∈ [n] and a < b we have |viga | ≥
|vigb |.
2: Initialize allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) with Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ [n].
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: Pick a vertex i that has no outgoing edges in G(A), i.e., i is a sink vertex in G(A).
{The algorithm maintains the invariant that G(A) is acyclic. Hence, such a vertex is guar-
anteed to exist.}
5: Update Ai ← Ai ∪ {gj}.
6: if the current envy graph G(A) contains a cycle then
7: Use Lemma 6 to update A and, hence, obtain an acyclic envy graph.
8: end if
9: end for
10: Return A.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 5
It is clear that the ALGCHORES runs in polynomial time. To establish the stated claim, in the
remainder of this proof we will show that v1(A1) ≥ 4n−13n µ1; an analogous argument establishes
the desired bound, vi(Ai) ≥ 4n−13n µi, for all other agents.
Write A = (A1, . . . , An) to denote the allocation returned by the algorithm ALGCHORES. Let
gr be the last chore allocated to agent 1. Note that gr may not lie in A1, this is because of the swaps
in bundles which occur while using Lemma 6. Let A′ be the allocation just after the chore gr is
allocated, and letA′i be the bundle currently assigned to agent i (gr ∈ A′1). Since, gr is the last chore
allocated to agent 1. Hence from Lemma 6 we have, v1(A1) ≥ v1(A′1) (i.e. |v1(A1)| ≤ |v1(A′1)|).
Since chores are only allocated to sinks. Hence, when gr was allocated to agent 1, she did not envy
any other agent. That is: |v1(A1)| ≤ |v1(A′1)| ≤ |v1(Ai)|+ |v1(gr)| ∀ i 6= 1. Summing this inequality
over i, we get:
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|v1(A1)| ≤ 1
n
|v1(A1)|+∑
j 6=1
(|v1(Aj)|+ |v1(gr)|)

≤ 1
n
(n|µ1|+ (n− 1)|v1(gr)|)
≤ |µ1|+ (1− 1
n
)|v1(gr)|
Here, the second inequality follows from the fact that
∑n
i=1 v1(Ai) = v1([m]) ≥ nµ1 and all the
involved quantities (vi(Ai), v1([m]) and µ1) are non-positive.
Suppose |v1(gr)| ≤ 13 |µ1|. Then,
|v1(A1)| ≤ |µ1|+ (1− 1
n
)|v1(gr)|
≤ |µ1|+ 1
3
(1− 1
n
)|µ1|
=
4n− 1
3
|µ1|
Hence, to prove theorem 5, we only need to consider the case when the last chore assigned
to agent 1 has value less than 13µ1. i.e. |v1(gr)| > 13 |µ1|. So, from now on, we will assume that
|v1(gr)| > 13 |µ1|.
The proof of lemma 7 is similar to proofs in [Gra66], and we provide it here for completeness.
Lemma 7. Consider an additive valuation function v. Let {p1, p2, . . . , pd} be the set of chores to be par-
titioned among n, with d ≤ 2n and v(p1) ≤ v(p2) ≤ . . . v(pd) ≤ 0. If |v(pd)| > |µ3 |—where µ is the
n-maximin share of the valuation function v—then the partition
P = ({p1}, {p2}, . . . , {p2n−d}, {p2n−d+1, pd}, {p2n−d+2, pd−1}, . . . , {pn, pn+1})
achieves the maximin share under the valuation v.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that the partition P does not achieve the maximin share. Hence,
there exists is a bundle in P that has value less than µ. Note that every chore must be assigned
to some partition, therefore v(p1) ≥ µ. Hence, the bundle in P , that has value less than µ must
contain at least 2 chores. Define index l := min{h | h ≥ n, |v({p2n−h+1, ph})| ≥ |µ|}.
Note that, for all i ≤ (2n − l + 1) and j ≤ l such that i 6= j, we have |v({pi, pj})| = |v(pi)| +
|v(pj)| ≥ |v(p2n−l+1)|+ |v(pl)| = |v({p2n−l+1, pl})| ≥ |µ|.
Therefore, in any partition that achieves the maximin share, say M, the (2n − l + 1) chores
{p1, p2, . . . , p2n−l+1} must be allocated to (2n − l + 1) singleton bundles (i.e., these chores are
allocated by themselves); in particular, in M, they are not paired with any chores from the set
S := {p2n−l+2, . . . , pl}. Hence, the (2l − 2n + 1) chores in the set S are assigned to the remaining
(l−n−1) bundles. This implies, by the pigeonhole principle, that some bundle inM gets 3 chores.
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Hence, this bundle is of value less than 3v(pd) < µ. But, this contradicts the fact thatM achieves
the maximin share µ.
As noted earlier, |v1(A1)| ≤ |v1(A′1)|. Hence it is enough to prove that, |v1(A′1)| ≤ |µ1|.
We will now prove that r is atmost 2n. Suppose for contradiction r > 2n, then in any partition
P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) there exists a bundle Pk with 3 chores {gi1 , gi2 , gi3} ⊆ Pk such that i1, i2, i3 ≤ r
(by the pegionhole principle). Therefore, v1(Pk) ≤ v1({gi1 , gi2 , gi3}) ≤ 3v1(gr) < µ1. In particular,
this is true for partitions that achive maximin share under the valuation v1, which contradicts the
definition of µ1.
We will now prove that A′1 contains at most 2 chores. Suppose for contradiction |A′1| ≥ 3.
Therefore, |v1(A′1 \ {gr})| ≥ 2|v1(gr)|. Recall, agent 1 was assigned the chore gr only when she
did not envy any other agent. Therefore, |v1(A′j)| > 2|v1(gr)| ∀ j ∈ [n]. Also, recall that the
partial allocation A′ only allocates the chores {g1, g2, . . . , gr}. And, by adding more chores to be
allocated, we can only decrease the n-maximin share. Now let f : 2[r] → R be defined so that
f(S) =
∑
c∈S f(s) and f(j) =
⌊ |v1(gj)|
|v1(gr)|
⌋
. Hence, |v1(S)| ≥ f(S) · |v1(gr)| for all S ⊆ [r]. Note that gr
is the highest valued chore among {g1, g2, . . . , gr}. i.e. |v1(gk)| ≥ |v1(gr)| for all k ∈ [r]. Therefore
we have, f(S) is at least the size of S. Hence, for any j ∈ [n] \ {1}:
• For j such that |A′j | ≥ 2: Since f(A′j) ≥ |A′j |, we have f(A′j) ≥ 2.
• For j such that |A′j | = 1: Since |v1(A′j)| > 2|v1(gr)|, we have f(A′j) ≥ 2.
Also from assumption we know that |A′1| ≥ 3, hence we have f(A′1) ≥ 3. Therefore, f([r]) =∑n
i=1 f(A
′
i) ≥ 2n + 1. Therefore for any partition P , there exists a bundle Pk such that f(Pk) ≥ 3.
Since |v1(gr)| > 13 |µ1| and |v1(Pk)| ≥ f(Pk) · |v1(gr)|, this implies that v1(Pk) is less than µ1. In
particular, this is true for partitions that achive maximin share under the valuation v1, which
contradicts the definition of µ1. Therefore, |A′1| ≤ 2.
Since A′1 contains at most 2 chores, we have the following 2 cases:
• The first case we consider is when A′1 contains exactly 1 chore. In every partition there is
a bundle that contains the chore gr. In particular, there is a bundle that contains the chore
gr, in the partition that achives the maximin share under the valuation v1. Therefore, µ1 is
upper bounded by v1(gr). i.e. |v1(gr)| ≤ |µ1|. This implies that |v1(A′1)| = |v1(gr)| ≤ |µ1|.
• The second case we consider is when A′1 contains exactly 2 chore. Since ALGCHORES allo-
cates the first n chores to n different bundles, thereforeA′1 = {gl, gr} (where l ≤ n). Moreover
since agent 1 was assigned the chore gr only when she did not envy any other agent, there-
fore at most (2n − r) bundles can be singleton. i.e. l ≥ 2n − r + 1. Hence from lemma 7,
there is a partition P (that achieves the maximin share under the valuation v1) with a bundle
Ps = {g2n−r+1, gr}. Therefore |v1(A′1)| ≤ |v1(Ps)| ≤ |µ1|.
Therefore if |v1(gr)| > 13 |µ1|, then the allocation A is maximin fair (according to agent 1). i.e.
v1(A1) ≥ |µ1|. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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C Examples
C.1 EF1 does not imply Maximin Fair
The following simple example shows that an EF1 allocation may not have a constant-factor max-
imin guarantee.
Consider an instance with n agents, 2n − 1 goods, and identical valuations v: v(j) = 1 for all
1 ≤ j ≤ n and v(j) = n for all n + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n − 1. Note that allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) =
({1}, {2, n+1}, {3, n+2}, . . . , {n, 2n−1}) is EF1. Furthermore, considering allocationB = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) =
({1, 2, . . . , n}, {n+ 1}, {n+ 2}, . . . , {2n−1}) we get that the maximin share, µ, under the valuation
v is at least n: mini∈[n] v(Bi) = n.
But, given that v(A1) = 1, we get an EF1 allocation which does not have a constant factor
maximin guarantee.
C.2 Nonexistence of Maximin Fair Allocation
The following simple example shows an instance where valuations are submodular and a (0.75+)
approximate maximin fair allocation does not exist (for any  > 0).
Consider an instance with 2 agents, 4 goods ({a1, a2, b1, b2}). Agent 1’s valuation is denoted by
v1 and defined by: v1(S) = 1 for all |S| = 1; v1({x1, x2}) = 2 for all x ∈ {a, b}; v1({ai, bj}) = 1.5 for
all i, j ∈ {1, 2}; v1(S) = 2.5 for all S such that |S| = 3; v1({a1, a2, b1, b2}) = 3. Agent 2’s valuation
is denoted by v2 and defined by: v2(S) = 1 for all |S| = 1; v2({aj , bj}) = 2 for all j ∈ {1, 2};
v2({x1, y2}) = 1.5 for all x, y ∈ {a, b}; v2(S) = 2.5 for all S such that |S| = 3; v2({a1, a2, b1, b2}) = 3.
One can easily check the submodularity of v1 and v2.
According to agent 1, there is only one unique maximin fair partition P = ({a1, a2}, {b1, b2})
and agent 1’s maximin share is 2. Similarly, according to agent 2, there is only one unique maximin
fair partition P ′ = ({a1, b1}, {a2, b2}) and agent 2’s maximin share is also 2. For any allocation A,
if agent 1’s value for his own bundle is atleast 2, then agent 2’s value for his own bundle is atmost
1.5. And, for any S ⊆ {a1, a2, b1, b2} and i ∈ {1, 2}, we know that vi(S) ≥ 2 or vi(S) ≤ 2. Therefore,
in this instance, it is not possible to construct a (0.75 + ) approximate maximin fair allocation (for
any  > 0).
It is relevant to note that if we have two agents with additive valuations, then a maximin fair
allocation always exists. This example shows that such a guarantee does not hold for submodular
valuations.
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